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pp. 10-18.) Goggin first
to

district

actual

(Appellant's reply brief, p. 4.) This

is frivolous because it is well established that an appellate court may
the actual holdings of a lower court.

Goggin next argues that specific

intent to violate the law is an element of conspiracy, and therefore she should
get a new trial to assert this defense. (Appellant's reply brief, pp. 5-9.) Review
of

law and applicable authority establishes that intent to do the criminal act is

sufficient intent to support a conspiracy, and intent to violate the law is not
required.

Because the district court erred as a matter of law, it abused its

discretion by granting Goggin a new trial and must be reversed.

8.

Goggin's Argument That The Cross-Appellant May Not Challenge The
Holding Of The Trial Court On An Issue Raised By A Motion Is Frivolous
Issues are preserved for appellate review when they are either raised to or

decided by the trial court. State v. Duvalt, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641,
1

(1998). The issue
a new

on cross-appeal

. "Should the district court's

because intent

violate

of conspiracy in Idaho?" (Respondent's brief, p. 4.)
that

law is not an
state argues

district court erred by granting a new trial "after concluding that specific

intent to violate the law is required for a conspiracy conviction." (Respondent's
brief, p. 10.) Review of the record shows that this issue was both raised to and
decided by the trial court, and is therefore preserved for appellate review.
In her brief in support of her motion Goggin claimed giving Instruction 27,
which stated that mistake or ignorance of the law was not a defense, was error.
(R., pp. 938-44.) Specifically, she argued that "the State should have been
required to prove that Ms. Goggin and her alleged co-conspirators entered into
an agreement with malevolent purposes."

, p. 941.) She asserted there was

"no evidence" she knew the substance she agreed to manufacture or deliver
"was illegal in Idaho" and that if she "[did] not know or believe that the objective
of the agreement [was] illegal" then the agreement "[was] not a conspiracy." (R.,
pp

942-43.)

She asserted that her belief that the substance "was legal"

"negate[d] the specific intent required" for a conspiracy conviction. (R., pp. 94344.)
The state responded to Goggin's claim that instructing the jury that
mistake of law was not a defense by pointing out that there was no evidence that
she did not know the substance was a synthetic cannabinoid meant for human
ingestion, and the claim she "believed what [she was] doing was legal" was
"exactly what [made the jury instruction] an appropriate and necessary instruction
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Goggin's assertion that Instruction 27 was erroneous, and was therefore raised
in Goggin's motion.

The state clearly opposed Goggin's motion and asserted

that instructing the jury that mistake of law was not a defense was proper.
Finally, the district court clearly granted a new trial on the basis that a mistake of
law negates the intent necessary to sustain a conviction for conspiracy.
Goggin's argument that whether the district court erred by granting a new trial is
not preserved for appellate review is specious.

C.

Ignorance Or Mistake Of Law Is Not A Defense To Conspiracy Under
Idaho Law
A person is guilty of conspiracy in Idaho if he "combine[s] or conspire[s] to

commit any crime or offense prescribed by the laws of the state of Idaho." I.C. §

3
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intent necessary to commit
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objective,

underlying substantive offense."

146 Idaho 331, 337, 193 P.3d 878, 884 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v.

Munhall, 118 Idaho 602, 606, 798 P.2d 61, 65 (Ct. App. 1990)). Missing from
language of the statute and these elements in the cases is any requirement
that the defendant operated under knowledge that

object of the conspiracy

was illegal. Inferring such a requirement is contrary to the plain language of the
statute as well as controlling and persuasive authority. (Appellant's brief, pp. 1018.)
Goggin first contends that the use of the phrase "crime or offense" instead
of "act" as the object of the conspiracy "shows that the statute requires the
defendant to understand that the act that is being agreed upon is actually a
crime." (Appellant's reply brief, p. 6.) This argument is meritless. The object of
the conspiracy in this case, manufacturing or delivering of synthetic marijuana, is
a crime regardless of Goggin's professed mistake of law. See State v. Fox, 125
Idaho 924, 866 P.2d 181 (1993).

Because Goggin was not prevented by her

professed ignorance of the law from committing the crime she agreed be
committed, her ignorance of the law did not prevent her from conspiring to
commit the crime.

The plain language of the statute does not include any

element of knowledge of the illegality of the object of the conspiracy:

4

an

is a

n
only
to comm
102 Idaho 378, 384,
~==-:-=-=...:..:' 155

Idaho 684, 690,

221,307 P.3d 1247 (Ct.

2013); =~~=:.:..:, 1
146 Idaho

878,884 (Ct. App. 2008);
1281 (Ct. App. 2004);

798 P.2d 61, 65 (Ct.
1082, 1087 (Ct

State v.

1 P.3d 657, 663 (Ct. App. 2008);

331,337, 193 P.
199,90 P.3d 1

P.2d 665, 671 (1981).

1

=-=--''-'--'-'-:.=:...:.:=,

118 Idaho

1990); State v. Martin, 1 3 Idaho 461,
1

1

; ICJI 1101 (intent element

,606,
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is "that the

crime would be committed" (bracketed language omitted).)
Out of this controlling authority, Goggin addresses only one case, State v.
Rolon, asserting it "does not reach our specific question."

(Appellant's reply

brief, pp. 6-7.) Repeated statements in cases spanning decades cannot be so
easily dismissed. The law in Idaho is clear: a person who agrees with others to
commit a crime need only have "the requisite intent to commit the underlying
substantive offense" to be guilty of conspiracy.

Because the object of the

conspiracy in this case, manufacturing or delivery of synthetic marijuana, does
not require knowledge of the illegality of the act, knowledge of the illegality of the
object is not a defense to the conspiracy.
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brief,

conspiracy statute to require
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worded

the prosecution prove "the degree of crimina!

substantive offense itself" and rejected

argument

"that the Government must show a degree of criminal intent in the conspiracy
greater than is necessary to convict for the sUbstantive offense,"

at

686-87.
Goggin attempts to distinguish this case by claiming that "[o]f course" the
defendant in Feola knew assault was illegal, therefore his knowledge that the
objects

of his

assault were federal

officers

was

"only a jurisdictional

requirement." (Appellant's reply brief, pp. 7-8) This argument is devoid of any
legal authority and falls far short of even addressing the Supreme Court's
analysis. "A natural reading" of a statute prohibiting a conspiracy to "commit any
offense against the United States" is "that since one can violate a criminal statute
simply by engaging in the forbidden conduct, a conspiracy to commit that offense
is nothing more than an agreement to engage in the prohibited conduct" Feola,
420 U ,So at 687,

Goggin has chosen not to address the relevant part of the

Supreme Court's analysis.
Finally, Goggin asserts the state has "failed to prove that the district court
abused its discretion" because this is a "question of first impression" and
therefore not reversible even if this Court interprets the statute differently than
the district court, (Appellant's reply brief, pp. 8-9.) First, this is not a question of
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even
, and

result thereby achieved erroneous, has no basis in law.
Goggin did not assert a viable defense to conspiracy when she professed
ignorance of the illegality of the synthetic marijuana she agreed to manufacture
or deliver.

The district court erred by concluding that the jury instructions

erroneously deprived her of this non-defense.

Therefore, the district court's

order granting her a new trial to assert her ignorance or mistake of law defense
is reversible error.
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